Objectionable Obligations
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Many of our moral obligations result partly from wrongs or injustices, whether individual acts of wrongdoing or broader institutional or structural injustices. This article argues that in some of these cases, the agent is left “caged in” by their own moral obligation, in the sense that they are morally compromised whether they fulfil it or do not fulfil it. Since these are all-things-considered obligations, if an agent does not not fulfill their obligation, they act wrongly; and, if the obligation is a directed one, they wrong those to whom it is owed. But because of the relationship between the obligation and the wrong or injustice that generated it, fulfilling an objectionable obligation may perpetuate or even exacerbate that injustice; it may, more strongly, turn the agent into the instrument through which the original wrongdoer accomplishes his wrongdoing; or the obligation may require one to do something to the very people whom one is supposed to be caring for that severely harms them, something that in some way echoes the original injustice. The author calls these “objectionable obligations.” While the idea of an obligation that is itself morally objectionable can sound paradoxical, the article argues that it is quite coherent and provides us with an important normative resource, helping us to make progress in certain debates in normative ethics and political philosophy.
Source: The Philosophical Review
Author: Sophia Moreau
Institution: New York University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7140125485