Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: The standard Bayesian solution to the paradox of the ravens maintains that the degree of confirmation provided by seeing a nonblack nonraven is positive but negligible compared to that provided by seeing a black raven. I show that, unless we impose severe and unmotivated restrictions on the subject’s priors, this has the consequence that the cumulative confirmation provided by all the nonblack nonravens the subject expects to see is nonnegligible compared to the cumulative confirmation provided by all the black ravens the subject expects to see. If this is so, however, then the paradox retains its full force.
Source: Philosophy of Science
Author: Amit Karmon
Institution: University of Oxford
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,550
Funder: University of Cambridge
OpenAlex ID: W7140545012
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