Work

Racist perception

Year: 2026

Type: article

Abstract: It is increasingly common to hear talk of ‘racist perceptions’. While these have begun to be studied in the philosophy of mind (e.g. in debates about the border between perception and cognition), they’ve received relatively little attention in analytic philosophy of race, particularly regarding the analysis of racism. This paper advances an account of racist perceptions and draws out their implications for debates about the nature of racism. First, it argues for an account on which racist perceptions are best seen as manifesting racism rather than being racist-making. Second, it argues that views on which racist attitudes are irrational or immoral will be particularly ill-suited to handle racist perception. A desire to account for racist perception should push us towards either a bias-centred account of racism, or an ideology-based account.

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly

DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqag020

Author: Jordan Scott

Institution: University of Oxford

Language: English

Topic: Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Subfield: Sociology and Political Science

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $4,204

Funder: University of Oxford