States of affairs between logic and ontology
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: In the phenomenological tradition, a state of affairs is described as the objectual correlate of an act of judgement. This understanding of states of affairs is ambivalent in regards to its logical and ontological implications. I explore this ambivalence in terms of the following dialectic: states of affairs are what make our judgements true. But they do so because we can form true judgments that posit them. According to the approach of Alexander Pfänder, the logical properties of judgements determine the form of states of affairs (logical view). By contrast, in the approach of Adolf Reinach, the ontological properties of states of affairs determine the form of judgements (ontological view). The paper's conclusion is that neither of the two views can be fully endorsed on its own because neither is sufficient to account for all aspects of states of affairs that are relevant to a phenomenological approach.
Author: Daniel Neumann
Institution: University of Graz
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W7141593064