Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Citizens' assemblies are a form of democratic innovation in which a randomly selected panel of constituents deliberates on questions of public interest. We study a novel goal for the selection of panel members: maximizing the entropy of the distribution over possible panels. We design algorithms that sample from maximum-entropy distributions, potentially subject to constraints on the individual selection probabilities. We investigate the properties of these algorithms theoretically, including in terms of their resistance to manipulation and transparency. We benchmark our algorithms on a large set of real assembly lotteries in terms of their intersectional diversity and the probability of satisfying unseen representation constraints, and we obtain favorable results on both measures. We deploy one of our algorithms on a website for citizens' assembly practitioners.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Authors: de Azevedo, Gabriel, Gölz, Paul
Institution: Cornell University
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7150906803
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