Year: 1991
Type: article
Abstract: : Much of the analysis in open sources has been extremely optimistic about whether the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations against Iraq could have succeeded. Many analysts believe that the embargo eventually would have weakened Iraq, compelling Baghdad to accede to the UN's wishes without the necessity for armed intervention by Kuwait's allies. Operation Desert Storm launched by the multinational forces against Iraq in the early morning hours of 16 January 1991 has made a complete test of the embargo impossible. Historical experience, however, suggests that optimistic assumptions concerning the embargo may not be valid. Most blockades and embargoes have failed to force an opponent to yield, and states establishing an embargo-in an attempt to make it more effective-have been drawn on some occasions toward an undesirable strategy or course of action that otherwise may not have been chosen. To make matters more complicated, the effects of an embargo or the threat of an effective embargo have sometimes triggered acts of desperation from a state that believed it had no alternative. Thus, history suggests that the United Nations' embargo would not have reduced Iraq's will to resist, particularly over a short period, and would not have compelled Hussein to leave Kuwait docilely. Instead, the embargo may have pulled the United States and its allies in unanticipated directions or may have contributed to Hussein's choosing an aggressive or radical action such as the surprise use of chemical weapons.
Authors: Robert A. Doughty, Harold E. Raugh
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W71513172