Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.
Source: Journal of Conflict Resolution
Authors: Jerg Gutmann, Pascal Langer, Matthias Neuenkirch
Institutions: Universität Hamburg, Universität Trier
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $3,650
OpenAlex ID: W7151377855