An Emergentist Approach to Phenomenal Causality
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT Philosophers have long debated whether phenomenal properties can play genuine causal roles. In this article, I aim to develop an emergentist approach to phenomenal causality, an approach that attributes novel causal powers to phenomenal properties and rejects the causal closure of physics. I also compare this emergentist approach with an influential competing approach to phenomenal causality, the compatibilist account, which postulates a model of causal overdetermination understood broadly. There is a widespread view in the philosophy of mind that emergentism is physicalistically unacceptable (whereas compatibilism is consistent with physicalism). However, the article attempts to challenge this consensus by arguing for a physicalist version of emergentism, according to which phenomenal properties as well as their novel causal powers are grounded by (noncausal) physical properties and facts.
Source: Pacific philosophical quarterly
DOI: 10.1111/papq.70014
Author: Lei Zhong
Institution: Chinese University of Hong Kong
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,760
OpenAlex ID: W7154570489