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No Free Lunch in Formalizing Intrinsic Agency: Closure, Normativity, and Interpretive Commitments

Type: article
Abstract: Contemporary formal approaches to agency in cognitive science converge on four structural notions: closure, boundary maintenance (e.g., Markov blankets), integration, and graded individuation. This paper argues that these structures alone cannot determine intrinsic normativity. The same closure and recovery dynamics are compatible with multiple inequivalent orderings of states as better or worse for the system; genuinely for-the-system error and success therefore cannot be read off neutral structure. Once agency, perspective, and normativity are treated as intrinsic explanatory targets, interpretive neutrality becomes unstable. One must then either (i) read the formalisms instrumentally, (ii) introduce explicit bridge principles that fix normative authority and system-relative perspective, or (iii) interpret the underlying domain so that significance and perspective are not externally assigned. The diagnosis is developed through discussion of active inference, information-theoretic unity measures, and related frameworks in cognitive neuroscience and theoretical biology. Geometric and topological tools clarify the presupposed shared domain without fixing its ontology. The paper compares the main interpretive options - instrumental retreat, functional or enactive completion, explicit bridge-principle strategies, and experiential interpretation - and offers a methodological constraint: formal agency talk in the mind sciences can legitimately claim intrinsic targets only once the required interpretive commitments are made explicit.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7154660371
Cites: 14
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Related to: 10