Type: article
Abstract: The “Hard Problem” of consciousness—explaining how subjective experience arises from non-conscious matter—has resisted resolution despite extensive progress in neuroscience. This paper argues that the persistence of the problem reflects not an empirical gap but a category error rooted in physical realism with the assumption that matter is ontologically fundamental and consciousness derivative. We propose an ontological inversion grounded in Analytic Idealism, according to which awareness constitutes the fundamental field of reality and physical structures are its extrinsic appearances. Within this framework, the brain does not generate consciousness but functions as a dissociative boundary that constrains and localizes an underlying field of awareness. We formalize this boundary using the Free Energy Principle, interpreting Markov Blankets as the structural correlate of dissociation rather than its cause. This approach preserves the validity of neuroscientific correlations while reframing them as mechanisms of modulation rather than production. Crucially, the model yields a falsifiable prediction. During acute metabolic collapse (e.g., hypoxia), phenomenal complexity should transiently increase as inhibitory constraints fail, contrary to standard physicalist expectations. We conclude by briefly distinguishing biological instantiation of awareness from artificial simulation, suggesting that while current AI systems can model functional access consciousness, they lack the intrinsic dissociative boundaries required for phenomenal subjectivity.
Author: Qahtani, Mohammad
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7154661409