Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: This article analyzes the power relations that structure Mexico’s antitrust network from a critical political economy perspective. Drawing on Cerny’s concept of heterarchy, it examines how autonomous regulatory agencies, think tanks, international organizations, technocratic elites, and private corporations form a multilevel network that governs competition policy beyond the State. The article engages with debates on global governance, neoliberalism, and regulation, and contrasts different currents of neoliberal thought to show how competition is discursively legitimized while high levels of economic concentration are tolerated. Through the analysis of emblematic cases in the financial, energy, food, and telecommunications sectors, it argues that antitrust agencies have been more effective in constraining state action than in curbing private monopolistic practices. The article concludes that competition policy in Mexico has contributed to the fragmentation of the State and to the consolidation of a heterarchical regulatory structure that favors corporate interests and weakens developmental capacities.
Author: Alejandra Salas-Porras
Institution: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W7160059430