Work

Moral Tolerance: The Ethics of Social Punishment in Cases of Moral Disagreement

Year: 2026

Type: article

Abstract: ABSTRACT In many practical contemporary contexts, people need to make correct ethical judgements about how to respond to perceived wrongdoing—in particular, whether to punish it or tolerate it. This judgement can be challenging when the wrongdoer does not accept the allegation of wrongdoing at the level of moral principle, holding that the type of action in question was not wrong. This paper interrogates the ethics of using social (as opposed to official) punishments like public castigation, social exclusion, pressuring institutions, and non‐violent interference. Social punishment in the context of moral disagreement requires the consideration of a distinct set of ethical and epistemic factors—factors capable of distinguishing the ‘tolerably wrong’ (where social punishment will not be justified) from the ‘morally intolerable’ (where it is justified).

Source: Theoria

DOI: 10.1111/theo.70093

Authors: Hugh Breakey, Graham Wood

Institutions: Griffith University, University of Tasmania

Language: English

Topic: Philosophical Ethics and Theory

Subfield: Philosophy

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,240