Against Modal Humeanism
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT Ted Sider defends mereological nihilism against the possibility of gunk. He argues that if we accept modal Humeanism, then the possibility of gunk poses no threat to nihilism. This paper argues that Sider's argument fails because nihilism remains vulnerable to the possibility of gunk, even under modal Humeanism. Section 2 explains modal Humeanism in detail. Section 3 presents Sider's argument that nihilism is unaffected by the possibility of gunk. Section 4 provides a counterargument. Section 5 anticipates potential objections and responds to them.
Source: Analytic Philosophy
DOI: 10.1111/phib.70011
Author: Sanggu Lee
Institution: Syracuse University
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,900
OpenAlex ID: W7160775603