Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: I explore a problem for the standard process reliabilist analysis of proper inference in terms of conditional reliability. The difficulty involves Goodman’s new riddle of induction, which can be used to argue that inductive inferences are in fact conditionally unreliable, and hence that no inductive inference is capable of producing a justified belief given the conditional reliability analysis. Accepting this conclusion would commit reliabilism to an unattractive form of inductive skepticism. I then consider some ways a reliabilist could resolve this problem, finally proposing a new analysis incorporating inferential dispositions.
Source: Synthese
Author: Todd Stewart
Institution: Illinois State University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,190
Funder: Illinois State University
OpenAlex ID: W7161568256
