The Dynamics of Minority Shareholder Influence: The Impact of Growth and Debt on Dividend Payout Policy in Thai Listed Companies
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: The study investigates how minority shareholding affects dividend payout policy in Thai listed companies, with firm growth and debt burden positioned as joint financial moderators. Using a moderated moderation design through Hayes’ PROCESS Macro Model 3, the analysis draws on 2430 firm-year observations from 532 companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand during 2019–2023. Grounded in Agency Theory, Signaling Theory, and Pecking Order Theory, the results reveal a positive association between minority shareholding and dividend payouts, lending empirical support to the agency-based view of dividends as a governance mechanism. Nevertheless, corporate debt plays a negative moderating role, consistent with Pecking Order Theory’s prediction that leverage constraints reduce payout flexibility. The three-way interaction analysis further demonstrates that minority shareholder influence is contingent upon the firm’s financial context, particularly the joint configuration of growth prospects and leverage. In firms with simultaneously high growth and high debt, the governance role of minority shareholders is substantially diminished. On the other hand, in firms with high growth and low leverage, minority shareholders exert a stronger influence, consistent with Signaling Theory. The results reveal minority shareholder governance as financially contingent and highlight the need to assess financial constraints alongside ownership-based governance mechanisms in emerging capital markets.
DOI: 10.3390/jrfm19060376
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $1,689
OpenAlex ID: W7162107996