Feasibility of Cryptography In a Blockchain-Enhanced ICS Security
Year: 2026
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: Blockchain-homomorphic encryption (BC+HE) hybrids are increasingly promoted for Industrial Control System (ICS) security, yet their deployment at network edges violates fundamental real-time constraints. This paper demonstrates that BC+HE architectures introduce latencies of 51–440 ms in small networks (5–50 nodes), exceeding safety-critical loop requirements of ≤10 ms [21][22] by factors of 5–44×. Through a Latency Collision Matrix analysis spanning Purdue Model Levels 0–5, the paper shows that probabilistic blockchain consensus (non-deterministic jitter) and homomorphic encryption overhead (>100 ms compute-bound) create an architectural incompatibility: edge devices require >100k readings/sec with zero jitter, while BC+HE delivers significanlty less (< 1,000 TPS) with high variance. Offloading cryptography to SCADA gateways (Level 2) fails to resolve the problem, instead creating a ''dead zone'' bottleneck and exposing Level 2–3 inter-layer vulnerabilities. This paper proposes a Resource-Constrained Security Framework that decouples security layers: lattice-based lightweight cryptography (LBC) for Level 0-1 sensor-to-controller authentication (TLatticeAuth << Tsafety ), where the authentication time TLatticeAuth is significantly less than the safety margin Tsafety while reserving BC+HE for non-real-time enterprise layers (Levels 4–5). Lattice primitives (LWE, Ring-LWE) offer linear complexity, parallelizable operations, and deterministic execution suitable for FPGA/ASIC acceleration. The proposed architecture aligns cryptographic mechanisms with physical constraints rather than imposing IT security models on operational technology. This work delivers a falsifiable critique grounded in quantitative performance modeling: measured latencies, throughput limits, and architectural boundaries establish that current BC+HE integrations are operationally unsafe at ICS edges. The framework provides actionable guidance for operators (audit edge deployments, enforce layer separation), researchers (develop layer-specific metrics, hardware acceleration), and standards bodies (update IEC 62443 with latency budgets and cryptographic safety interfaces).
Authors: Kazi Kamal, Rafiqul Islam, Azizur Rahman
Institution: Charles Sturt University
Language: English
Subfield: Computer Networks and Communications
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W7162660287
