Year: 2026
Type: dissertation
Abstract: Critics of impartial moral theories object that these theories run afoul of the personal care and commitment we have for our loved ones. Defenders respond by separating moral theory from moral psychology. Granting this defense works, it leaves us with a question: what moral psychology should we have? I take up this question here, outlining 3 desiderata bearing on our moral psychology. I then show how a conflict emerges: caring for our friends and acknowledging the broader community pull us in opposite directions. I argue we can’t escape this conflict by appealing to Railton’s “sophisticated consequentialist” model nor by positing fundamental partial prerogatives. I argue for a solution on which imagination and care are essential to our decision-making.
DOI: 10.17615/ym3e-4047
Author: Ingram, Steph
Institution: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7162798657
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