Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: On some views of responsibility, the core case of actions for which we can be responsible are intentional actions or actions done for reasons. But our ordinary understanding of responsibility is broader: it includes responsibility for at least some failed actions when the failure is unintentional or inadvertent. I propose an account of responsibility for such failings based on the notion of control we have over our actions through skills and abilities. We are responsible for what we do, if an action is an exercise of the agent’s relevant abilities, be it successful or failed.
Source: Philosophical Studies
Author: Ulrike Heuer
Institution: University College London
Language: English
Topic: Free Will and Agency
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,190
OpenAlex ID: W7162849757