Work

Shareholder Coordination and Waste Management

Year: 2026

Type: article

Abstract: ABSTRACT This study examines how shareholder coordination relates to corporate waste management. Drawing on 1059 firm‐year observations from S&P 500 firms between 2010 and 2022, we show that higher levels of coordination among shareholders correspond to reduced waste generation. This effect is more pronounced in firms whose coordinated shareholders are more common. Moreover, we find that this negative coordination–waste link is stronger in firms with a higher CEO pay gap, lower board co‐option, and lower analyst coverage. Furthermore, we propose that shareholder coordination reduces waste generation through three mechanisms: agency costs, information asymmetry, and financial constraints. Our main results remain robust after a variety of endogeneity tests.

Source: Business Strategy and the Environment

DOI: 10.1002/bse.71065

Author: Mohamed Khalifa

Institutions: University of Nottingham, Mansoura University, University of Greenwich

Language: English

Topic: Corporate Finance and Governance

Subfield: Accounting

Field: Business, Management and Accounting

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Responsible consumption and production

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $4,480