Work

Agency mismatches limit the realised impact of water conservation measures

Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Water conservation is usually catalogued by technology – efficient fixtures, leak control, reuse, metering, process integration. That framing hides a stubborn fact: realised savings consistently fall short of engineering potential and often fade with time. Rebound, poor maintenance and behavioural decay explain part of the gap, but not all. A further share is an agency mismatch: the actor who would benefit from a measure lacks the authority, capacity and incentive to deploy it, while the actor who holds them does not benefit. That mismatch is not a new discovery – it is well documented in energy-efficiency and institutional-resource research – but it has not been systematically mapped for water conservation. Using the Scandinavian concept of rådighet (agency), separated here into capability (authority and capacity) and incentive alignment (motivation), I code water-conservation measures against the actors holding primary and secondary agency, and against how quickly each agency-holder can actually act. Clear patterns emerge: agency is concentrated for network measures and fragmented for building-scale ones; the largest potentials sit with the weakest-agency actors; concentrated agency and short latency rarely coincide outside the utility itself; and standards, pricing and digital infrastructure act as agency bridges. Two Swedish field trials illustrate why misaligned agency undermines otherwise sound technology, and the framework sets out what an agency-first approach means for policy.
Language: English
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $1,390
OpenAlex ID: W7164814193
FWCI:
Cites: 22
Cited by:
Related to: 10