Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Animal rights are presented here not merely as scientific or philosophical questions, but as matters of ordinary human common sense responding to animal sentience. That perspective is developed through abductive, commonsense reasoning rather than through deduction or induction. As a result, the law tends to protect dogs, primates, and other animals whose suffering is readily and vividly perceived by humans, whilst the legal status of insects remains comparatively fragile. Common sense responds most readily to animals that possess what this article calls a vivid soul—a presence felt most strongly where animals confront humans with a face and eyes that can meet the human gaze. On this account, soul is a fuzzy phenomenon that admits of degrees. The proper function of law, therefore, is not to maximise welfare, but to minimise the pain that humans inflict. Since animals cannot litigate in their own name, the article argues that their rights should, where necessary, be enforced through noncontentious procedures, enabling courts to act without the machinery of ordinary adversarial litigation.
DOI: 10.36151/dalps.116
Author: Hassan Jafaritabar
Institution: University of Tehran
Language: English
Topic: Animal Law and Welfare
Subfield: Law
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W7165736102