Work

Evidential knowledge first

Year: 2026

Type: article

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to motivate and defend Evidential Knowledge First, a view that combines the best of both knowledge first and evidentialist approaches to epistemology. To do so, I argue that knowledge is not the most general factive mental state. However, non-inferential knowledge is. After developing the core commitments of the view, I investigate what else the Evidential Knowledge Firster should say. A similar view is considered and rejected by Alexander Bird (2025). I conclude by addressing his objections.

Source: Synthese

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-026-05660-4

Author: Giada Fratantonio

Institutions: University of Lisbon, Centro de Filosofia

Language: English

Topic: Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Subfield: Philosophy

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,190

Funders: University of Glasgow, Universidade de Lisboa