Work

Bank vs. Trade Credit Financing for Emission Reduction: The Role of Retailer Information Disclosure

Year: 2026

Type: article

Abstract: This study constructs a Stackelberg game model for a supply chain comprising a capital-constrained manufacturer and a retailer with private demand information to analyze the interplay between the manufacturer’s carbon abatement financing strategy (bank credit vs. trade credit) and the retailer’s information sharing decision. The results show that the impact of information sharing is contingent on market sentiment. Sharing is beneficial, promoting abatement investment and supply chain performance under optimistic market forecasts, but it can suppress investment and increase emissions under pessimistic ones. Furthermore, the manufacturer’s financing choice is driven by the investment cost and carbon price; trade credit becomes more attractive for emission reduction as investment costs decrease and carbon prices rise. Counter-intuitively, higher forecast accuracy does not always incentivize information sharing, with its effects on disclosure and environmental performance exhibiting distinct threshold characteristics.

Source: Mathematics

DOI: 10.3390/math14132292

Authors: Jing Xia, Yifei Liu

Institution: Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications

Language: English

Topic: Supply Chain and Inventory Management

Subfield: Management Information Systems

Field: Business, Management and Accounting

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Climate action, Responsible consumption and production

Open Access status: gold

Estimated APC paid: $3,137