Work

Endogenous shareholding auctions

Year: 2026

Type: preprint

Abstract: We introduce endogenous shareholding auctions for production economies where a designer must elicit demand in order to determine price and quantity. Each of these auctions has the property that the auction's profit is distributed across the designer and the bidders in accordance with ownership shares that are determined over the course of the auction. We characterize this class, and a larger class, on the basis of standard axioms. Finally, we investigate optimal auctions according to both prior-free domination and subjective expected welfare. Applications include public housing, voluntary separation, and monopoly regulation.

Source: arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2607.02457

Authors: Mackenzie, Andrew, Trudeau, Christian

Institutions: Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, University of Windsor

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funders: Georgetown University, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

Award: G2869364366

OpenAlex ID: W7167233153

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