Work

Strategic Voting under Uncertainty: Admissibility and Approval Rules

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: How do voters behave when they are uncertain about electoral outcomes? We studystrategic behavior in single-ballot, non-ranked voting systems by combining anotion of admissibility with expected-utility maximization. The analysis ismotivated by elections in committees, expert panels, primary elections, andorganizational decision making, where voters often balance sincere preferenceexpression against strategic influence.We first study an ordinal framework based on dominance and a prudent extensionof preferences to sets of winners. Within the class of k-voting systems, weshow that approval voting has a distinctive property: admissible strategies arecompatible with sincere voting. By contrast, plurality and intermediatek-systems may force voters to exclude some preferred candidates when the quotaconstraint binds.We then introduce a cardinal framework in which a focal voter has utilities overcandidates and subjective beliefs about their probabilities of election. Under amarginal-influence model, approval voting generates a simple threshold rule:voters optimally approve the candidates whose utility exceeds the expectedutility associated with abstention. For any k
Source: HAL
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7167439849
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