Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: The hierarchical control structure of cyber-physical DC microgrids enables voltage regulation and power sharing. However, it introduces vulnerabilities to malicious attacks on voltage setpoint signals transmitted by the secondary control layer. Compromised voltage setpoints can destabilize microgrids by inducing voltage deviations, disrupting power sharing, and triggering cascading failures. To mitigate this critical gap, we propose an observer-based adaptive architecture combining (i) a state observer that estimates the states of distributed generator (DG) units under unknown load dynamics and physical interactions among DG units, and (ii) a real-time attack estimator to reconstruct adversarial signals. The integrated system actively compensates for corrupted voltage references, ensuring resilient operation. Theoretical analysis and verification case studies are carried out to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mitigation framework.
Authors: Mahdieh S. Sadabadi, Frede Blaabjerg
Institutions: University of Manchester, Aalborg University
Language: English
Subfield: Control and Systems Engineering
Field: Engineering
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7167802897