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Hospital-Physician Contracting with Social Preferences

Year: 2026

Type: article

Abstract: The impact of social preferences along with institutional efficiency of the hospital are explored on the optimal contract between the hospital and the physician where the physician’s effort is non-contractible. We show that the hospital may benefit from employing a more ‘social-regarding’ physician and might also benefit if the physician is more inequity-averse. The physician on the other hand benefits if she is attached to a more socially conscious hospital. Optimal health care increases with physician’s social-regarding altruism and hospital’s social consciousness.

Source: The B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2025-0408

Authors: Swapnendu Banerjee, Arijit Mukherjee, Sougata Poddar

Institutions: Jadavpur University, University of Nottingham, City University of Hong Kong, University of Iowa, Prince Mohammad bin Fahd University

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,712

OpenAlex ID: W7170915552

FWCI:

Cites: 39

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