Diplomacy without Reconciliation: Affective Acknowledgement, Recognized Loss, and the Political Receivability of Adversarial Bargains
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Why are materially advantageous diplomatic offers sometimes rejected as submission, while visible losses remain politically receivable as legitimate compromise? Material bargaining, coercive leverage, domestic audience response, attraction, face management, recognition, and emotional performance each explain part of this puzzle, but none specifies when an adversarial bargain can be publicly taken up as an authored option by those expected to live under it. Building on Emotional Sovereignty and the Affective Uptake Condition (AUC), this article develops affective acknowledgement as a relational condition under which offers can function politically as reasons for particular publics, not as an emotional rival to rational bargaining. It makes seven contributions. First, it translates AUC into international negotiation without attributing a mind or emotion to a state. Second, it defines affective acknowledgement and its hostile-setting minimum, passive acknowledgement. Third, it identifies diplomatic affective inversion: benefit can be rejected under domination, whereas visible loss can remain receivable under acknowledged authorship. Fourth, it formulates a recognized-loss proposition with strict exclusions for deception, existential coercion, rights violations, and irreversible subordination. Fifth, it specifies coercive beneficence and a designer-enforcer-evaluator structure of external affective capture in which the same actor also benefits from its own interpretation of elicited compliance. Sixth, it distinguishes unequal capabilities from equality of addressability. Seventh, it establishes a capture boundary separating genuine grievance from manufactured uptake. A concept-forming design translates five noncompensatory conditions into observable traces and refutation tests. Structured illustrations and boundary probes from U.S.–China diplomacy, the Iran nuclear file, the INF Treaty, and Ukrainian and Russian wartime cases generate plausibility, not causal estimates. The outcome is political receivability, not agreement, approval, justice, or post-agreement durability.
Author: Hong, Sunghyuck
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7172320403
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