Social norms solve coordination problems paradoxically created by shared interests
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Human cooperation is motivated both by shared interests arising from kinship and friendship and by social norms, but whether these mechanisms substitute for or complement one another remains debated. Cooperative farming among Derung horticulturalists offers an ideal study context, because most cofarming occurs among kin or friends, and a norm prescribes equal harvest division by household regardless of contributions. We show that this norm solves two problems that shared interests cannot solve, or may even exacerbate. First, shared interests expand the range of acceptable divisions, making coordination harder. By specifying a salient division, the norm resolves this problem. Second, cofarmers often misperceive how much their partner benefits. By prescribing a division independent of cost-benefit assessments, the norm prevents these differences from unraveling cooperation. The complementary action of norms and shared interests may explain why humans cooperate with kin and friends more than other animals.
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7172467746