Year: 2026
Type: dissertation
Abstract: In The Empirical Stance Bas Van Fraassen observes that much of today’s analytic philosophy is plagued by false consciousness—systematically mischaracterizing its activities and accomplishments, thereby sabotaging its own efforts. We can avoid this by treating our philosophical positions as stances, rather than theories. His book is an account of how this could be done in the case of empiricism; however, if the empirical stance is to include a voluntarist epistemology it would isolate the normative force of reason within domains of discourse and their respective communities. This would realize an epistemic value pluralism, reducing epistemic normativity to a matter grounded in social permissiveness, itself practically constrained by little more than empirical facts about shared linguistic practices. I submit that pre-theoretical practical constraints on epistemic agency form a pragmatic normative basis for rationally responsive decision-making, and that even an empiricist may rationally view such decisions as grounded in the metaphysical.
Author: Griggs-Burr, Alexander
Institution: University of Guelph
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7202008209
