Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Workforce collapse is a tail event: burnout cascades, turnover spirals, and safety failures offer a firm no upside and its financiers nothing but downside. This paper argues that the claimant structurally positioned to guard against that tail is not the shareholder but the creditor. Equity holds a convex claim that participates in every upside and truncates every loss, so it rationally tolerates tail risk; debt holds a concave claim with no upside beyond repayment, so the tail is its whole problem. Creditors also hold their positions for years rather than months, concentrate exposure rather than diversify it away, and already receive private information through loan monitoring. The paper shows that creditor control over workforce outcomes exists today but points the wrong way: covenants written on financial triggers bind only after damage is done, and the documented response to violations is employment and welfare austerity that further impairs the asset securing repayment. The proposed correction is contractual rather than regulatory. Well-being covenants, affirmative maintenance clauses written on workforce indicators that lenders and borrowers already measure, move the control trigger upstream from financial distress to its operational antecedents, and replace acceleration with remediation. The argument coins no new measurable construct and requires no valuation of well-being; it reallocates an existing governance technology. Falsifiable implications are stated using observed variables, including loan spreads, covenant composition, injury rates, and turnover. The framework extends behavioral models of prosocial corporate investment by adding the third claimant their two-actor conflict omits.
Source: Research Square
Author: Shay Tsaban
Institution: Peres Academic Center
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7202129290
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