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NotPetya: Anatomy of a Cyberweapon Disguised as Ransomware

Year: 2026
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: On June 27, 2017, a malicious software package propagated across thousands of networks worldwide under the guise of ransomware. This paper presents a comprehensive analytical examination of NotPetya—one of the most destructive cyberattacks in recorded history. We analyze three interconnected dimensions of the attack: (1) the geopolitical and threat-actor context, including the attribution to the Russian GRU-affiliated group Sandworm and the exploitation of the Ukrainian software supply chain; (2) the malware’s technical architecture, covering its modular components, multi-vector propagation mechanisms, and disk-destruction payload that conclusively categorized it as a wiper rather than ransomware; and (3) the operational consequences for global organizations and the lasting transformations it imposed on cybersecurity practice and policy. Our analysis draws on post-incident technical reports from Kaspersky, Cisco Talos, and Mandiant, as well as official attribution statements from the US and UK governments. The findings demonstrate that NotPetya represented a paradigm shift in state-sponsored destructive cyberoperations, with implications that continue to shape threat modeling and incident response frameworks.
Language: English
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W7203626556
FWCI:
Cites: 1
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Related to: 9