Single-layer mutation induces asymmetric cooperation dynamics in interdependent networks
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Mutation provides a source of payoff-independent strategy variation in evolutionary games, yet its role in interdependent networks remains unclear when random strategy changes are localized in only one layer. We study the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma game on interdependent square lattices, where both layers follow imitation dynamics and are coupled through fitness, while mutation is applied only to one layer. This asymmetric setting allows us to distinguish the direct effect of mutation in the mutated layer from the coupling-mediated response of the non-mutated layer. We find that mutation generally suppresses cooperation in the mutated layer by repeatedly disturbing cooperative clusters. In contrast, intermediate mutation rates can enhance cooperation in the non-mutated layer under weak dilemma conditions. Analyses of spatial strategy configurations indicate that this enhancement depends on whether cross-layer aligned cooperative clusters are maintained under interlayer fitness coupling. When the temptation to defect becomes stronger, these aligned clusters are no longer maintained and the cooperation enhancement in the non-mutated layer disappears. These results suggest that localized mutation can generate asymmetric evolutionary outcomes in interdependent populations by altering how cooperative clusters are spatially organized across layers.
Source: Chaos Solitons & Fractals
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,970
Awards: G7468816045, G7501375028, G8711433747
OpenAlex ID: W7203700420