Work

Assignment markets with capacitated middlemen: core and competitive equilibria

Year: 2026

Type: article

Abstract: We consider a three-sided market where each buyer-seller pair can attain a profit only if there is a middleman that connects them. This profit does not depend on the identity of the middlemen, and each buyer and seller can take part in at most one partnership while middlemen can establish multiple partnerships, up to their capacity. We show that the core is non-empty and strictly contains the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors that coincides with the set of solutions of the dual q -assignment problem, where q is the total capacity of the middlemen.

Source: International Journal of Game Theory

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-026-01007-y

Authors: Saadia El Obadi, Silvia Miquel, Marina Núñez

Institutions: Euro Mediterranean University, Universitat de Lleida, Universitat de Barcelona

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,190

Funders: Generalitat de Catalunya, Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, Universitat de Barcelona, Agencia Estatal de Investigación