Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Are beliefs subject to moral norms? Doxastic moralists argue that we can morally wrong others by what we believe about them – say, by holding racially prejudiced beliefs. Opponents argue that we cannot morally wrong others by holding beliefs: it only seems as if beliefs can wrong others because beliefs are connected to wrongful inquiry, attention, or assertion. Such debunking explanations face a problem: they cannot explain moralist intuitions concerning our accountability practices when there are no blameworthy actions in belief’s vicinity. I propose that this problem can be solved by appealing to epistemic accountability practices, such as epistemic blame and epistemic atonement. A belief can be epistemically blameworthy even if there was no blameworthy action in its vicinity; and this calls for practices of redress that resemble moral practices. In this way, endorsing our epistemic sociality – i.e., acknowledging how we hold each other epistemically accountable for beliefs – undermines a main motivation for moralizing beliefs.
Source: Synthese
Author: Sebastian Schmidt
Institutions: University of Zurich, University of Johannesburg
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,190
Award: Relational Epistemology
OpenAlex ID: W7204249879