Year: 2026
Type: dissertation
Abstract: This thesis proposes a neo-Aristotelian grounding for Ross’s prima facie duties as a response to the grounding objection. In chapter two, I argue that a normative naturalist conception of human essence provides humans with intrinsic normative status. This status creates primitive objective normative reasons which require a fitting response, creating normative and moral obligations for other humans. In chapter three, I explain why these reasons become obligations on others. I argue that humans have a capacity of practical reason that derives from our essence, which allows us to grasp this status and these obligations. Given this primitive normativity, we are normatively and morally obligated by these primitive normative reasons pre-recognition of intrinsic normative status, and given our capacity of practical reason post-recognition of intrinsic normative status, we can be held morally responsible. In the fourth chapter I argue that social relationships are teleologically necessary for the development of our capacity of practical reason. In the fifth chapter I argue that Ross’s prima facie duties make up the fitting response to recognizing others’ intrinsic normative status, and that Ross’s conception of intuition fits within my naturalist conception if it is understood as mature reflection. I conclude that my neo-Aristotelian grounding successfully responds, at least in part, to each of the aspects of the grounding objection. As such, it provides a plausible naturalist grounding for Ross’s ethical intuitionism.
Author: London, Jordyn
Institution: Queen's University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7209166222