Work

Politics, Investor Protection and Competition

Year: 2007

Type: preprint

Abstract: External finance is critical for less established entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection can hinder competition. We model how lobbying by incumbents may reduce access to finance in countries where politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and industries, we find that (i) the number of producers and entry rates are positively correlated with investor protection in financially dependent sectors, and (ii) countries with more accountable political institutions have better investor protection.

Source: SSRN Electronic Journal

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.957783

Authors: Enrico C. Perotti, Paolo F. Volpin

Institutions: Centre for Economic Policy Research, University of Amsterdam, City, University of London, European Corporate Governance Institute, Drexel University

Language: English

Topic: Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

Subfield: Strategy and Management

Field: Business, Management and Accounting

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Peace, justice, and strong institutions, Decent work and economic growth

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W7213239597

Cites: 35

Cited by: 54

Related to: 10