Cautious and fair social evaluation under risk
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: In this paper, we study criteria for social evaluation of resource distributions under risk when individuals have expected utility preferences but their utility functions are interpersonally non-comparable. In particular, we focus on cautious evaluation with respect to ex-post distributions. As a key rationality axiom, we adopt Negative Certainty Independence, introduced by Dillenberger (2010). Using this axiom together with Pareto conditions that are compatible with both the rationality axiom and ex-post equity, we characterize a class of social criteria called Cautious Equally Distributed Equivalent (CEDE) criteria. These criteria evaluate risky situations by the lowest certainty equivalent over a set of social utility functions constructed from individual utility functions.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Authors: Miyagishima, Kaname, Nakamura, Kensei
Institution: Hitotsubashi University
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7213324112
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