Year: 2022
Type: preprint
Abstract: We study divestment strategies followed by a responsible investor concerned with financial returns and social impact, but unable to commit to future trades. Exclusion starves brown firms of capital, reducing externalities, but provides no incentives for corrective actions. Conditional investment rewards reform, but helps the firm expand and increase externalities. Reform arises only for intermediate social concerns. Stronger concerns can backfire: the investor excludes even after positive signals of reform, making conditional investment non-credible. Greater disclosure of environmental and social performance can also backfire, because stock prices then more fully reflect reform costs, thereby weakening managers' incentives to undertake reform.
Authors: Alex Edmans, Doron Levit, Jan Schneemeier
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7213351035
