Year: 2026
Type: dissertation
Abstract: This dissertation consists of three papers in the field of public economics. The first paper is co-authored with Arjan Lejour, Simon Rabaté, and Maarten van ’t Riet. It investigates how the measurement of wealth inequality is affected by offshore tax evasion. Using data from a tax amnesty in the Netherlands, we find that this type of tax evasion is concentrated among the wealthy. Wealth hidden offshore is typically excluded from conventional estimates of inequality, implying that these estimates underestimate the true level of wealth inequality. The concentration of offshore wealth appears to be lower in the Netherlands than in other countries. We explore several explanations for this. One is the availability of low-cost evasion opportunities in neighboring countries. Another is that the Netherlands’ wealthiest households face low effective tax rates, implying that the incentive to evade taxes is low as well.I further explore the topic of effective taxation in the second paper which is co-authored with Arjan Bruil, Céline van Essen, Arjan Lejour, Jan Möhlmann and Simon Rabaté. This paper uses rich administrative data to measure the level of inequality of income in the Netherlands before and after redistribution. We are able to link firms to their shareholders through a corporate ownership registry, allowing us to compute the first exact all-in effective tax rate for the super rich internationally, inclusive of individual-level as well as firm-level taxes. We find that the overall tax system is largely flat and regressive at the top. At the very top, income taxes make up a negligible share of income and corporate taxes only partially make up for this. We also have access to exceptionally detailed administrative data on government spending, both in cash and in-kind. While in-kind transfers reduce inequality, this effect is muted by the substantial degree of re-ranking they induce.The analysis of the second paper is entirely descriptive and it does not answer the question how incomes and tax burdens change as a result of tax reforms. The third paper is co-authored with Egbert Jongen. It studies a tax reform in the Netherlands that levied a payroll tax on employers of employees earning at least €150,000 in 2012 and 2013. We use linked employer-employee data and income tax returns to investigate how this tax affected the wages of workers. We find that the wages of regular employees did not respond, implying that their employers bore the full burden of the tax. In sharp contrast, owner-managers were able to lower their wages and thereby reduce their tax liability. Some owner-managers are constrained by anti-avoidance rules that set a minimum level of pay. We find that these owner-managers are unable to avoid the tax, suggesting that such anti-avoidance rules can be effective.
Author: Leenders, Wouter
Institution: University of California, Berkeley
Language: English
Topic: Economic and Fiscal Studies
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: offshore tax evasion, tax amnesty, effective tax rate, super-rich, income inequality, redistribution, in-kind transfers, re-ranking, corporate ownership, payroll taxes, owner-managers, anti-avoidance rules, tax burden, corporate taxation, income tax, employer-employee data, tax avoidance, wealth concentration
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7213485786
