Public Credit Guarantees, Financial Frictions, and Macroeconomic Stabilization: Evidence from Italy in the 2020–2022 Emergency Period
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: CLIFF SGR Research Center Working Paper No. 2026-01. This version was presented at the International Conference in Banking and Financial Studies (ICBFS 2026), University of Parma, 10 September 2026. A revised version is in preparation. Comments are welcome: [email protected]. Abstract. This paper examines the macroeconomic role of the public credit guarantee schemes adopted in Italy during the 2020-2022 emergency period. Since no available study identifies a direct elasticity between guarantees and GDP, the analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it consolidates and subjects to a coherence comparison the firm-level treatment effects estimated by other authors, showing that two independent studies, based on different datasets, converge on a credit additionality of roughly 0.6-0.85 euro per euro of guaranteed amount. Second, it proposes an original scenario-based aggregation exercise that applies the marginal effects to the volumes of loans approved under the Central Guarantee Fund (about 226 billion euro net of moratoria, the main scenario) and, in an extended out-of-sample scenario, also to those of the SACE Garanzia Italia scheme, for about 268 billion euro in total. The exercise is preceded by a dimensional compatibility check between the units of the coefficients, the denominators, the time dimension and the reference population, and yields an annual investment-flow differential in 2022 of about 38-46 billion euro and an end-2022 employment-stock differential of about 340-400 thousand employees. These values are partial-equilibrium scenario intervals, neither confidence intervals nor identified bounds, and every figure is traced back to the source table from which it derives. A stress test on the market-exit margin shows that extrapolating the estimated reduction in exit probability depends decisively on the reference population, which the evidence does not identify: the margin is therefore excluded from the aggregation. The allocative question is addressed directly: the available Italian evidence indicates that non-viable firms had less, not more, access to support, which attenuates but does not eliminate the zombification concern. On the fiscal side, the schemes generated a large stock of contingent liabilities against calls that remained below one per cent of the guaranteed exposure through 2024: a ratio to be read as a feature of the instrument, not as evidence that the underlying risk is negligible. Disclaimer. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of CLIFF SGR S.p.A. This paper is a scientific research contribution and does not constitute investment research, an investment recommendation or marketing material within the meaning of MiFID II and the applicable Consob regulations. CLIFF SGR S.p.A. is an asset management company authorised and supervised by the Bank of Italy and Consob. I used Claude as a research and writing assistant.
Author: Lamonaca, Christian
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7214071084
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