Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions: CHERI Instruction-Set Architecture (Version 5)
Year: 2021
Type: report
Abstract: This technical report describes CHERI ISAv5, the fifth version of the Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI) Instruction-Set Architecture (ISA) being developed by SRI International and the University of Cambridge. This design captures six years of research, development, refinement, formal analysis, and testing, and is a substantial enhancement to the ISA versions described in earlier technical reports. This version introduces the CHERI-128 “compressed” capability format, adds further capability instructions to improve code generation, and rationalizes a number of ISA design choices (such as system permissions) as we have come to better understand mappings from C programming-language and MMU-based operating-system models into CHERI. It also contains improvements to descriptions, explanations, and rationale. The CHERI instruction set is based on a hybrid capability-system architecture that adds new capability-system primitives to a commodity 64-bit RISC ISA enabling software to efficiently implement fine-grained memory protection and a hardware-software object-capability security model. These extensions support incrementally adoptable, high-performance, formally based, programmer-friendly underpinnings for fine-grained software decomposition and compartmentalization, motivated by and capable of enforcing the principle of least privilege. Fine-grained memory protection also provides direct mitigation of many widely deployed exploit techniques. The CHERI system architecture purposefully addresses known performance and robustness gaps in commodity ISAs that hinder the adoption of more secure programming models centered around the principle of least privilege. To this end, CHERI blends traditional paged virtual memory with a per-address-space capability model that includes capability registers, capability instructions, and tagged memory that have been added to the 64-bit MIPS ISA. CHERI learns from the C-language fat-pointer literature: its capabilities describe fine-grained regions of memory and can be substituted for data or code pointers in generated code, protecting data and also providing Control-Flow Integrity (CFI). Strong monotonicity properties allow the CHERI capability model to express a variety of protection properties, from valid C-language pointer provenance and C-language bounds checking to implementing the isolation and controlled communication structures required for compartmentalization. CHERI's hybrid system approach, inspired by the Capsicum security model, allows incremental adoption of capability-oriented software design: software implementations that are more robust and resilient can be deployed where they are most needed, while leaving less critical software largely unmodified, but nevertheless suitably constrained to be incapable of having adverse effects. For example, we are focusing conversion efforts on low-level TCB components of the system: separation kernels, hypervisors, operating-system kernels, language runtimes, and userspace TCBs such as web browsers. Likewise, we see early-use scenarios (such as data compression, protocol parsing, image processing, and video processing) that relate to particularly high-risk software libraries, which are concentrations of both complex and historically vulnerability-prone code combined with untrustworthy data sources, while leaving containing applications unchanged.
Source: CL Technical Reports
DOI: 10.48456/tr-891
Language: English
Subfield: Hardware and Architecture
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7214197657