Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: In a continuous coordination game, under myopic best response, players change strategies, and thus strategic communities change their shapes in time. We show that the boundaries of these strategic communities evolve according to Free Boundary Mean Curvature Flow in the continuous time limit. The convergence relies on an approximation scheme for the Mean Curvature Flow, which has previously been used to describe other threshold dynamics. With this equivalence, we can characterize Nash equilibria of the continuous coordination game as minimal surfaces and explore related consequences in biased versions of the same game.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Authors: McAlister, John S., Burns, Nathan
Institutions: Princeton University, University of Tennessee at Knoxville
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: National Science Foundation
OpenAlex ID: W7214969773