Work

Essays on Law, Politics and Economics

Type: dissertation
Abstract: This thesis provides an analysis of the effects of the form of government, the electoral rule and the level of judicial independence on the level of de jure agency independence that national legislatures grant to securities and exchange regulation agencies.The first paper is titled Delegation and Political Control in an Oversight Game.It studies the effects of introducing information ambiguity and changes to the penalty in a legislatorbureaucrat oversight interaction using Nash and minimax solution concepts.The level of information accuracy is interpreted as reflecting administrative procedures in the delegating legislation.The penalties are interpreted as representing the levels of managerial autonomy and political independence in the delegating legislation.Also included is a variable for the cost of engaging in oversight.The equilibria produced by the models are used to ascertain which manipulations of informational accuracy, penalties and costs of oversight best serve to increase the bureaucrat's effort under the different solution concepts.The implications of these results for comparative politics are discussed and hypotheses are suggested from these implications.based on the effects of judicial independence on a legislating coalition's strategy given the key idea that it is easier for political players to motivate agencies than to motivate courts.From this perspective, it is hypothesized that higher judicial independence generally leads to a rise in the regulatory capabilities granted to agencies.This effect ought to be stronger in systems where legislating coalitions are more cohesive and so better able to motivate agencies.It is therefore hypothesized that in less cohesive systemspresidential and proportional representation systemshigher judicial independence leads to a relative fall in agencies' regulatory capabilities.The results from a cross sectional instrumental variable regression show support for these three hypotheses.
Institution: University of Turin
Language: English
Subfield: Law
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7217434962
Cites: 87
Cited by:
Related to: 10