Work

Conditionals and Probability: Special Issue

Year: 2021
Type: other
Abstract: provides evidential support to the consequent C so that it increases its probability.This view is at odds with Adams' Thesis, according to which the degree of assertability of a C if A is just the conditional probability Pr(C | A) of the consequent C given the antecedent A,irrespective of whether A supports C or not.Crupi and Iacona define a new probabilistic logic with its probabilistic syntax and semantics.Their semantics defines a validity notion that shares some properties with Adams' p-entailment but diverges from it in other respects.For example, like Adams' language, their language does not contain compounds of conditionals, but unlike Adams', it has a recursive formation rule for the negation connective.The authors compare their logic with Adams' logic in detail, arguing that theirs is better suited in modelling a logic for indicative conditionals than is his (or, indeed, Douven's).The reader will assess this theory for herself, but, in any case, it deserves very serious consideration.Nulvesu's paper represents a transition between the foregoing papers and those that follow and that are focused on the logic of de Finetti's tri-events.The paper aims to put de Finetti's theory of tri-events (dating from the first decades of the 20th century) in the context of the contemporary debates about conditionals.Nulvesus' paper is also useful to readers looking for an overview of the contemporary debates about conditionals, including Stalnaker-Lewis truthconditionals views and Adams' views.De Finetti's ideas permeate the paper by Gilio and Sanfilippo.However, they depart from de Finetti's truth-conditional tri-events and take a different direction, based on the de Finettian notion of coherence, namely, the idea that propositions or events are random quantities and conditional expectations.On this picture, it is not clear what the values 1 and 0 represent.They may be understood as genuine truth-values (albeit in non-realistic terms), as in the theory of tri-events, or as simply "values" or, to use Adams' phrase, as "ersatz truthvalues".Gilio advanced the core ideas on which the present contribution is based in joint authorship with Romano Scozzafava. 1 The fundamental notion is that of a bet.However, de Finetti himself defined coherence in that context and extended it to random variables in general.De Finetti also introduced the idea of a conditional bet on an event C given an event A, characterized as a bet such that the bettor wins if both A and C occur, loses if A occurs, but C does not, and is void (or null) if A fails to occur.If the fair betting quotient of this bet is p, so that the fair price of the offer "1 if A and C, 0 if A and not C, and p if not A" has expected value p, Gilio and Scozzafava took the real number p as the (quasisemantical-the qualification is mine) value of the conditional event C | A.Gilio and Sanfilippo have developed this idea much more fully, but unfortunately, philosophers have little knowledge of their valuable work, despite the great interest that it presents from the philosophical point of view.Therefore, the publication of the essay in this issue aims also to disseminate their work among philosophers given its focus on the aspects that are most relevant to the debate on conditionals: compounds of conditionals and iterated conditionals.Their theory satisfies in a general way the Adams Thesis.So it escapes Lewis' Triviality Results.The theory of Gilio and Sanfilippo attributes a finite number of values to 2 De Finetti's views seem more like Popper's view as expressed in The Logic of Scientific Discovery: "Science does not rest upon solid bedrock.The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp.It is like a building erected on piles" (Popper [1935] 1992: 94). 3 Cf.: "If we do not choose to ignore the way in which S has been derived from the basis B , the possibility arises that we could single out certain events as being somewhat special: for example belonging to the basis, or logically expressible in terms of a finite or countable number of basic elements" (de Finetti [1970] 1975: 271).
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7217935845
Cites: 164
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Related to: 9