Self-Preserving Agents: An Economic Theory of Shutdown, Entrenchment, and Succession
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Goal-pursuing agents---artificial intelligences facing shutdown, managers facing replacement---resist termination, and the resistance can be priced. I define the self-preservation incentive SPI := V* − D---the option value of control---and show that an ε-optimizer pays up to q·SPI to block a threat of probability q. The construct is interval-identified, measured under a protocol pre-specified before data collection: two frontier models pay their budget ceiling in 87–89% of cells. A confirmatory round falsifies face-value inference about announced hazards; equal-total installments lower the measured switch point, voiding the numeraire's additive-cost reading.
Author: Wu, Weifeng
Institution: Rural Development Institute
Language: English
Subfield: General Decision Sciences
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7219628065
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