Work

Conservation concessions or green grabbing? A critical perspective on mega conservation investments

Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Market-based mechanisms have gained traction in environmental governance during the Anthropocene. One such mechanism is conservation concessions, which are promoted in the Global South as a neoliberal strategy that aligns ecological protection with economic rationality. Yet empirical evidence on their actual conservation outcomes and community benefits remains scanty. In this perspective, we argue that within prevailing capitalist frameworks, conservation concessions risk functioning as a form of green grabbing. Anchored in a political economy approach and critical agrarian studies, we synthesize evidence from multi-country case studies, with particular attention to Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Malawi, to examine the interplay between state power, transnational capital, and local agrarian structures. Our analysis reveals that despite being discursively framed as apolitical and win-win, conservation concessions can lead to: (i) restructuring of property and access rights, alienating customary users from their subsistence means; (ii) creation of precarious labor relations that often fail to offer viable alternatives for displaced smallholders; and (iii) reconfiguration of rural class dynamics, empowering conservation-oriented elites while marginalizing the agrarian poor. We conclude that conservation concessions represent a symptomatic response by capitalism to its own ecological contradictions, commodifying and financializing nature as a new frontier of accumulation. The study advocates for a foundational shift toward radical land tenure security, community-led forest governance, and agroecological perspectives. We offer a critical framework for evaluating the socio-ecological viability of conservation investments and call for renewed debate on agrarian futures in the Anthropocene.
Language: English
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $2,353
OpenAlex ID: W7219653427
FWCI:
Cites: 41
Cited by:
Related to: 10