Work

Essays on relations, properties, and (quantum) objects

Year: 2022
Type: dissertation
Abstract: Typically, the bundle theorist takes universals to be immanent in that they are 'in' spacetime.Universals are also thought to be pure in that they do not ontologically depend on particulars.See Armstrong (1978) for realism about universals.For early advocates of Bundle Theory, see Russell (1940) and Ayer (1954).See O'Leary-Hawthorne (1995), Rodriguez-Pereya (2004), and Demirli (2010) for some of the recent defenders of the theory.I will not discuss in this paper the trope-bundle theory, according to which particulars are bundles of particularized properties called tropes (see Williams 1953 and Campbell 1990). 2 I assume that some facts are grounded in others.For foundational discussions on grounding, see Audi (2012), Fine (2012), Rosen (2010), Schaffer (2009), and Trogdon (2013).entities in different contexts, 7 no one has offered, to my knowledge, an argument for the view that weak discernibility can explain diversity.On the other hand, several philosophers have argued that weak discernibility fails to explain diversity mainly due to circularity reasons.8 My aim in this paper is to support the weak discernibility solution by arguing that weak discernibility does explain diversity at least for some important case.More precisely, I will defend the following thesis:(Relationism) For any particulars x and y and any distance relation R, if Rxy, then [Rxy] (fully) explains [x ≠ y], where a distance relation is a spatial relation of the form being n meters from (n > 0). 9 To this end, I will present a positive argument for Relationism in section 2, based on the impossibility of the co-location of certain kinds of indiscernible particulars.In sections 3 and 4, I will address some of the objections to Relationism found in the literature. 2 An Argument for Relationism My positive argument for Relationism relies on the following principle: 7 See, for instance, Ladyman (2005), Saunders (2006), and Demirli (2010).8 See Russell (1911-1912: 15-17), Allaire (1965), and MacBride (2006: 66-67).9 Relationism, I take it, is compatible with there being full explanations for [a ≠ b] other than [Rab], even if [Rab] obtains, for, arguably, metaphysical explanation can be overdetermined.For instance, suppose that a and b had different colors.It would still be true, according to Relationism, that a ≠ b because they are two meters from one another.At the same time, however, it can also be true that a ≠ b because, say, one is red and the other blue.
Author: Lee, Seungil
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7220773324
Cites: 75
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Related to: 10