Fiduciary Duties and Minority Shareholder Protection under New York Corporate Law
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: New York occupies a distinctive position in United States commercial law. Its courts hear disputes involving public companies, private enterprises, investment structures and closely held businesses, while state statutes provide a framework for corporate governance, shareholder remedies and limited liability companies. This article examines the relationship between directors’ fiduciary obligations, the business judgment rule and minority-investor protection under New York law. It argues that the system is best understood as a set of interacting doctrines: statutory duties of care and good faith; judicial deference to informed, disinterested business decisions; heightened scrutiny of conflicts and controller transactions; and procedural remedies through derivative actions and, in limited circumstances, judicial dissolution. The article compares corporations under the Business Corporation Law (BCL) with limited liability companies (LLCs), whose operating agreements can play a central role in allocating authority and risk. It also considers the direct–derivative distinction, corporate records and litigation strategy. The central conclusion is that effective minority protection depends on matching the alleged wrong to the correct legal vehicle and developing evidence that identifies either corporate injury or a distinct personal injury.
Author: Meyers, Michael
Institution: Brooklyn Law School
Language: English
Topic: Corporate Governance and Law
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7221614014
FWCI:
Cites:
Cited by:
Related to: