Get started
Work

Some pathē are better than others : the role of shame in Aristotle's account of moral development

Year: 2026
Type: dissertation
Abstract: Aristotle claims we become virtuous by doing virtuous actions. Aristotle clarifies the activity of the learner, and the virtuous activity of the virtuous person are distinct; the virtuous person meets conditions of knowledge, choice, and stability. This gives rise to a familiar puzzle: how does the learner’s distinctive activity give rise to the dispositions proper to virtuous activity. Building on Marta Jimenez's recent account of shame’s contribution to moral development, I propose a novel account of shame’s role in Aristotle’s account of moral development. Jimenez argues that shame responds to a problem about acting with the proper motivations, by contrast, I argue shame is more explanatorily powerful, responding to what I call the feelings to reason problem. The feelings to reason problem concerns reconciling Aristotle’s claims about moral habituation with his descriptions of immature and virtuous agents. Learners, in their pre-habituated state, act according to emotions (kata pathos). By contrast, the virtuous person acts according to reasoned choice (kata prohairesin): she chooses fine actions, and chooses them for the sake of the fine. The problem can be formulated as follows: How does the learner’s performance of fine actions, performed kata pathos, give rise to the disposition to act kata prohairesin? Drawing on close analysis of the Nicomachean Ethics, with relevant passages from the Rhetoric, I develop the Deliberative Account of shame (DA). I argue shame facilitates the learner’s transition from acting kata pathos to acting kata prohairesin. DA argues shame is a deliberative tool: shame is a cognitively complex pathos that prompts and structures the learner's deliberation according to moral considerations. By getting learners to practise deliberating in this way, shame contributes to the development of rational excellences – namely, excellent deliberation (euboulia) – which are necessary to choose fine actions, and choose them for the sake of the fine.
DOI: 10.17630/sta/1738
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7221752115
Cites:
Cited by:
Related to: